How Phones Are Tracked: Carriers, Apps, Stingrays, Spyware
Last reviewed
By Dark Flock
Updated
You don't have to use your phone for it to give you away. Switched on, it checks in with the nearest tower every few minutes. Its apps ask where you are. Its ad libraries pass the answer along. None of that needs a hacker. Most of it is a business model.
Tracking comes in two kinds. Passive tracking is the record the phone leaves just by working: carrier logs, Wi-Fi chatter, app location sold through brokers. Active tracking is someone going after the device itself: a fake cell tower, a forensic unlocking kit, spyware. The first catches everyone. The second is aimed. This guide covers both, what the courts have said as of October 20, 2026, and what lawful settings actually change.
How we sourced this: court opinions, FTC orders, government audits, and contract records first, then reporting from established outlets; company claims are labeled as the company's, and anything only reported is marked as reported.
Passive phone tracking: the record you leave by carrying it
Can police get my location from my cell carrier?
Your carrier has to know roughly where your phone is to route a call. It keeps that record: which tower and which sector the phone connected to, and when. Lawyers call it cell-site location information, or CSLI.
In 2018, in Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court held that police getting seven days of a person's historical CSLI from a carrier is a Fourth Amendment search, which generally requires a warrant. The Court wrote that a phone "faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor's offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales."
Carriers have also sold it to people who are not police. In April 2024, the FCC fined AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon nearly $200 million combined, finding that each sold access to customers' location to "aggregators" who resold it, often with no valid customer consent. AT&T and Verizon argued that they were owed a jury trial. On June 4, 2026, the Supreme Court rejected that argument 8 to 1 in FCC v. AT&T.
What is a tower dump?
A tower dump is the reverse: instead of asking where one phone went, police ask for every phone that connected to a given tower during a window of time. Near a highway, that can be thousands of strangers.
On August 5, 2026, U.S. District Judge Carlton Reeves in Mississippi refused to approve four such warrants and held that "tower dumps are per se unconstitutional," calling them general warrants. He relied on Carpenter, Chatrie, and the Fifth Circuit's 2024 ruling in United States v. Smith, which called geofence warrants general warrants. The government filed its appeal to the Fifth Circuit on September 3, 2026. It is one district judge so far. Elsewhere, tower dumps continue.
Can Wi-Fi and Bluetooth be used to track my phone?
With Wi-Fi on, a phone periodically broadcasts "probe requests" looking for networks it knows. Bluetooth devices advertise themselves too. Each radio has a hardware address, and a sensor that logs those addresses can count and follow devices: in stores, in transit stations, and now, Leonardo says, beside license plate readers (we covered its SignalTrace product in our Flock camera guide).
Phone makers answered with MAC address randomization: the phone shows a different, made-up address to networks and scanners. Apple calls its version a private Wi-Fi address. It helps. It is not a cloak. A 2021 study in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies found modern, updated phones resisted most known tricks for linking randomized addresses, while many older devices remained vulnerable. Earlier research showed that timing and the details of each probe could link a device's random addresses back together. Randomization raises the cost. It doesn't erase the trail.
How do apps sell my location data?
Most commercial location data starts with a permission you granted to an app that had a reason to ask: weather, a game, a prayer-time app, a transit map. Many apps embed third-party code, called an SDK, that collects GPS coordinates and sends them to a data company along with your phone's mobile advertising ID. The ID is not your name. It doesn't need to be. A device that sleeps at one address and spends the workday at another tends to identify itself.
Since 2022, the FTC has described the market in its own complaints:
- X-Mode Social / Outlogic (January 2024). The FTC's first settlement with a data broker over sensitive location data. It said the company sold raw, non-anonymized location data tied to ad IDs, including to "private government contractors," and had no policy for removing sensitive locations until May 2023. The order bars it from selling sensitive location data.
- InMarket (2024). Barred from selling or licensing precise location data and from targeting people based on visits to sensitive places.
- Gravy Analytics and Venntel (final January 2025). The FTC said they sold location data without verified consent "for commercial and government uses." The order bars sensitive location data "except in limited circumstances involving national security or law enforcement."
- Mobilewalla (final January 2025). Barred from selling sensitive location data, including from political gatherings and labor union offices.
- Kochava (2026). Sued in 2022, it agreed in May 2026 to settle. The proposed order bars it and its successor, Collective Data Solutions, from selling sensitive location data without affirmative express consent.
Note what these orders do: they wall off clinics, churches, shelters, and protests. Selling everyone's ordinary movements isn't banned by any of them.
What is bidstream data, and why does it leak location?
Every time an app loads an ad, it can broadcast a bid request to many companies in a real-time auction. The request can carry your ad ID, device details, IP address, and sometimes location. Only one bidder wins the ad. All of them can keep the data.
The Mobilewalla order was the first time the FTC called that harvesting unfair: the company is now banned from collecting auction data for purposes other than bidding. In January 2025, a hack of Gravy Analytics exposed files that 404 Media and WIRED reported listed thousands of apps, including Candy Crush, Tinder, and MyFitnessPal. Researchers believed the data was skimmed from the ad auctions rather than collected by the apps themselves. You can do everything right inside an app and still be in the bidstream.
Can police buy my location data without a warrant?
They have, and they do, and the Supreme Court has not said they can't.
- Fog Reveal. EFF's 2022 records investigation found Fog Data Science selling local and state police point-and-click access to location histories derived from ad IDs, for less than $10,000 a year, and that Fog and some agencies didn't think a warrant was required. Nevada's Department of Public Safety signed a Fog contract in January 2026 for about $12,000 a year, KSNV reported.
- DHS. A September 2023 DHS inspector general audit found that CBP, ICE, and the Secret Service bought "commercial telemetry data" from phones, including historical location, without following the privacy rules federal law requires.
- ICE, again. In January 2026, 404 Media reported that ICE had bought access to Penlink's Webloc, a tool designed to watch a neighborhood for phones and follow them home or to work, and that an internal ICE legal analysis concluded commercial location data can be queried without a warrant. Citizen Lab's April 2026 analysis said Webloc draws on data "purchased from consumer apps and digital advertising." On September 23, 2026, ICE awarded Penlink a new contract for Tangles and Webloc licenses worth up to $50 million, according to SAM.gov.
The theory behind all of it is that a warrant is for compelling data, and buying it is just shopping. Our data broker guide covers that loophole and the bill that would close it.
Are geofence warrants still legal after Chatrie?
A geofence warrant asks a company for every device inside a drawn boundary at a given time, then narrows the list until it gets names. In 2020, Google got more than 11,000 of them.
On June 29, 2026, in Chatrie v. United States, the Supreme Court held that police conducted a search when they obtained Okello Chatrie's Location History from Google. Justice Kagan wrote for the Court: "An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records about his cell phone's location," and police intrude on it "even though for only a limited time, and from a third-party tech company." The Court rejected the government's argument that turning on Location History was a voluntary handover. Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment on different grounds. Justices Alito, Thomas, and Barrett dissented.
What it did not decide matters as much:
- Whether the warrant was valid. The Court sent that back to the Fourth Circuit, step by step: was each stage of the three-step process supported by probable cause and described with particularity?
- Whether the evidence comes in anyway. The good-faith exception is also back with the Fourth Circuit.
- Purchased data. Chatrie concerned data police compelled from Google. It says nothing directly about data an agency buys.
The practical ground had already shifted. The opinion notes that in July 2025 Google began storing Location History on users' devices rather than its servers, and that Google says it can no longer answer geofence warrants for that data. Google was the most common recipient of those warrants, but the Court noted, citing a Fourth Circuit judge, that Apple, Lyft, Snapchat, and Uber have received them too. A database that doesn't exist can't be searched. The ones that do exist still can.
Active phone tracking: when someone goes after the device
What is a Stingray, or cell-site simulator?
A cell-site simulator, often called a Stingray after an early Harris model, impersonates a cell tower. Phones in range connect to it, and it learns their identifiers and approximate location. Some models can also intercept calls, texts, and internet traffic, as TechCrunch reported. It cannot pick only the target. Every phone nearby answers.
Since 2015, Justice Department and DHS policies have generally required a warrant to use one, with exceptions for emergencies. Interfering with cell signals yourself is a federal offense, per the FCC. A February 2023 DHS inspector general audit found that the Secret Service and ICE's Homeland Security Investigations did not always follow the rules, including failing to get court orders required when using the devices in emergencies. ICE bought cell-site simulator vehicles from TechOps Specialty Vehicles for $818,000 in September 2024 and $825,000 in May 2025, TechCrunch reported from public records. The company confirmed that it supplies the simulators but said it doesn't make them.
The ACLU and EFF track which agencies have these devices. We describe them here and stop there. Detecting, jamming, or defeating them is out of scope.
Can police unlock and copy my phone?
Often, yes. Forensic kits from Cellebrite and Magnet Forensics' GrayKey are built to unlock phones and copy their contents. In Riley v. California (2014), the Supreme Court held that police generally need a warrant to search a phone seized during an arrest. A warrant still opens the phone.
The race is now about time. Since fall 2024, iPhones restart themselves after 72 hours locked, and police race that clock. Forbes reported in October 2026 that a tool called GrayKey Preserve can stop that timer, and that ICE's Homeland Security Investigations bought it. A sheriff's sergeant told Forbes the device extracts nothing; it holds the phone in place until a warrant arrives.
The same tools have been misused. In December 2024, Amnesty International reported that Serbian police and intelligence used Cellebrite tools to unlock journalists' and activists' phones and, in at least two cases, install spyware. Cellebrite then suspended the Serbian customers involved.
What are Pegasus and Paragon spyware?
Mercenary spyware is the top of the market: remote infection, sometimes "zero-click," meaning the target never taps anything. Once installed, it reads messages before encryption matters. Citizen Lab has documented NSO Group's Pegasus against journalists and activists for a decade. On October 19, 2026, it reported with high confidence that the rector of the University of Belgrade, a supporter of Serbia's student movement, was hacked with Pegasus in 2026. In the U.S., a federal court entered a permanent injunction in 2025 barring NSO from targeting WhatsApp users.
Paragon's Graphite reached WhatsApp users in 2025; Citizen Lab confirmed infections of journalists in Italy. ICE revived a paused $2 million Paragon contract in August 2025. In an April 1, 2026 letter, acting director Todd Lyons acknowledged approving a commercial spyware tool for Homeland Security Investigations' use against foreign terrorist organizations and fentanyl traffickers, NPR reported. In May 2026, DHS told NPR that ICE has "no relationship" with Paragon; the contract was closed out January 20. DHS declined to say what tool Lyons approved. So: spyware, yes; whose, unstated.
What is stalkerware?
The cheapest active tracking is installed by someone with your phone and your passcode. Stalkerware apps upload messages, photos, and location to whoever paid. They also leak. In February 2026, TechCrunch reported that a hacktivist scraped more than 500,000 payment records for phone-monitoring apps including uMobix and Xnspy, adding that dozens of these apps have exposed victims' data over the years. The FTC banned SpyFone and its CEO from the surveillance business in 2021.
If you suspect it, the FTC and the Coalition Against Stalkerware give the same caution: removing it can alert the person who installed it. Make a safety plan first, ideally with a domestic violence advocate, from a device they can't reach.
How to reduce phone tracking lawfully, and where it stops working
None of this makes you invisible. Your carrier's records are outside your control, and so are court orders. What you control is how much extra you hand over.
- Audit location permissions. Give location only to apps that need it, set them to "While Using," and turn off precise location where approximate will do. This cuts off the SDK supply line at the source.
- Limit the ad ID. On iPhone, turn off "Allow Apps to Request to Track." On Android 12 and later, you can delete the advertising ID. EFF's guide walks through both. The bidstream can still see your IP address.
- Keep private Wi-Fi addresses on, and turn off Wi-Fi and Bluetooth when you aren't using them.
- Check where your location history lives. On Android, Google Maps Timeline is now stored on the device. Set a short auto-delete and keep any cloud backup encrypted.
- Update the phone. Updates close the flaws spyware and forensic tools rely on, once those flaws are known. If you have reason to think you are individually targeted, Apple's Lockdown Mode and Google's Advanced Protection exist for you.
- Use a strong passcode. It does more than the lock screen suggests.
Phone settings for a protest
EFF's Surveillance Self-Defense guide to attending a protest is the best single reference. The short version:
- Turn off face and fingerprint unlock. EFF notes U.S. law gives a memorized passcode stronger protection against compelled unlocking than biometrics.
- Airplane mode stops new tower records while it's on. It doesn't erase the trip there. On iPhone, Apple says it turns off every radio except Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi can be switched back on inside it. Check the toggles.
- A secondary phone with little personal data limits what a seizure exposes. EFF warns that carrying it alongside your main phone links the two.
- Faraday bags block signals only as well as they're made, and the phone reconnects the moment it comes out. Treat any maker's blocking claim as that maker's claim.
- Leaving the phone at home is the only setting with no exceptions. It also means no photos, no calls, and no way to find your friends. That is a real trade, made person by person.
We sell packs, and a pack is not a Faraday bag.
The phone isn't the villain here. It is a device that has to know where it is to work, owned by people who found out what that knowledge sells for. The limits that exist came from a few judges and one federal agency, mostly in the last three years. Judges, contracts, and votes will settle the rest.
Sources
Courts
- Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (U.S. June 29, 2026): https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018): https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-573/pdf/USREPORTS-573-373.pdf
- FCC v. AT&T, Inc., No. 25-406 (U.S. June 4, 2026): https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-406_nmip.pdf
- FCC, "FCC Fines AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon Nearly $200 Million" (Apr. 29, 2024): https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-402213A1.txt
- FCC, Jammer Enforcement: https://www.fcc.gov/general/jammer-enforcement
- WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies, No. 4:19-cv-07123 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025), order granting permanent injunction: https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/california/candce/4%3A2019cv07123/350613/802/0.pdf
- United States v. Smith, No. 23-60321 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2024): https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-60321-CR0.pdf
- In re Four Applications for Search Warrants (Tower-Dump Warrants), No. 3:25-cr-38 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 5, 2026): https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mssd.127963/gov.uscourts.mssd.127963.41.0.pdf
- Same case, government's notice of appeal (Sept. 3, 2026): https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mssd.127963/gov.uscourts.mssd.127963.42.0.pdf
Federal agencies and contracts
- FTC, X-Mode Social and Outlogic order (Jan. 9, 2024): https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/01/ftc-order-prohibits-data-broker-x-mode-social-outlogic-selling-sensitive-location-data
- FTC, InMarket order (Jan. 18, 2024): https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/01/ftc-order-will-ban-inmarket-selling-precise-consumer-location-data
- FTC, Gravy Analytics and Venntel final order (Jan. 14, 2025): https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-finalizes-order-prohibiting-gravy-analytics-venntel-selling-sensitive-location-data
- FTC, Mobilewalla final order (Jan. 14, 2025): https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-finalizes-order-banning-mobilewalla-selling-sensitive-location-data
- FTC, Kochava settlement (May 4, 2026): https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/05/ftc-ban-kochava-subsidiary-selling-sensitive-location-data-settle-charges-they-sold-location-data
- FTC, SpyFone ban (Sept. 1, 2021): https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2021/09/ftc-bans-spyfone-ceo-surveillance-business-orders-company-delete-all-secretly-stolen-data
- FTC Consumer Advice, "Stalkerware: What To Know": https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/stalkerware-what-know
- DHS OIG-23-61, commercial telemetry data (Sept. 2023): https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-09/OIG-23-61-Sep23-Redacted.pdf
- DHS OIG-23-17, cell-site simulators (Feb. 2023): https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-03/OIG-23-17-Feb23-Redacted.pdf
- DOJ, Department Policy Guidance on Cell-Site Simulator Technology (2015): https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download
- DHS Policy Directive 047-02, cell-site simulator technology (2015): https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/law-enforcement/mgmt-dir_047-02-dept-policy-regarding-use-cell-site-simulator-technology.pdf
- SAM.gov, ICE award notice 70CMSD26D00000002, Penlink Tangles and Webloc licenses (Sept. 2026): https://sam.gov/workspace/contract/opp/0193d486044a4e5b980cae25ed7e0048/view
Research and civil liberties groups
- Citizen Lab, "Uncovering Webloc" (Apr. 9, 2026): https://citizenlab.ca/research/analysis-of-penlinks-ad-based-geolocation-surveillance-tech/
- Citizen Lab, "Targeting Democracy: Pegasus and Mercenary Spyware Attacks on Serbian Pro-Democracy Figures" (Oct. 19, 2026): https://citizenlab.ca/research/pegasus-spyware-serbian-pro-democracy/
- Citizen Lab, "Virtue or Vice? A First Look at Paragon's Proliferating Spyware Operations" (2025): https://citizenlab.ca/research/a-first-look-at-paragons-proliferating-spyware-operations/
- Amnesty International, Serbia: Cellebrite and NoviSpy (Dec. 2024): https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/12/serbia-authorities-using-spyware-and-cellebrite-forensic-extraction-tools-to-hack-journalists-and-activists/
- Amnesty International, "Cellebrite halts use of products in Serbia" (Feb. 2025): https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/02/cellebrite-halts-product-use-in-serbia-following-amnesty-surveillance-report/
- EFF, "Inside Fog Data Science" (Aug. 2022): https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/08/inside-fog-data-science-secretive-company-selling-mass-surveillance-local-police
- EFF, "Victory! Supreme Court Says Constitution Protects People's Location Data" (June 2026): https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/victory-supreme-court-says-constitution-protects-peoples-location-data
- EFF, "How to Disable Ad ID Tracking on iOS and Android": https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/how-disable-ad-id-tracking-ios-and-android-and-why-you-should-do-it-now
- EFF Surveillance Self-Defense, "Attending a Protest": https://ssd.eff.org/module/attending-protest
- EFF Street Level Surveillance, cell-site simulators: https://sls.eff.org/technologies/cell-site-simulators-imsi-catchers
- ACLU, Stingray tracking devices: https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/stingray-tracking-devices
- Coalition Against Stalkerware, "Stalkerware Detection, Removal and Prevention": https://stopstalkerware.org/stalkerware-detection-removal-and-prevention/
- Vanhoef et al., "Why MAC Address Randomization is not Enough," ASIA CCS 2016: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf
- Fenske et al., "Three Years Later: A Study of MAC Address Randomization in Mobile Devices and When It Succeeds," PETS 2021: https://erikrye.com/assets/files/succeeds-pets21.pdf
- Google, Supplemental Information on Geofence Warrants in the United States (2021): https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/supplemental_information_geofence_warrants_united_states.pdf
Company documents
- Apple, "Use Airplane Mode": https://support.apple.com/en-us/108785
- Apple, "Use private Wi-Fi addresses": https://support.apple.com/en-us/102509
- Apple, "About Lockdown Mode": https://support.apple.com/en-us/105120
- Google, Advanced Protection Program: https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/
Journalism
- 404 Media, "Inside ICE's Tool to Monitor Phones in Entire Neighborhoods" (Jan. 8, 2026): https://www.404media.co/inside-ices-tool-to-monitor-phones-in-entire-neighborhoods/
- 404 Media, "Candy Crush, Tinder, MyFitnessPal: See the Thousands of Apps Hijacked to Spy on Your Location" (Jan. 2025): https://www.404media.co/candy-crush-tinder-myfitnesspal-see-the-thousands-of-apps-hijacked-to-spy-on-your-location/
- WIRED, Gravy Analytics bidstream leak (Jan. 2025): https://www.wired.com/story/gravy-location-data-app-leak-rtb/
- KSNV News 3, "Privacy concerns raised as Nevada police get near real-time phone tracking without a judge" (Apr. 29, 2026): https://news3lv.com/features/breaking-down-the-law/privacy-concerns-raised-as-nevada-police-get-near-real-time-phone-tracking-without-a-judge
- SCOTUSblog, "Court rules against cell service providers over right to jury trial in FCC proceedings" (June 4, 2026): https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-rules-against-cell-service-providers-over-right-to-jury-trial-in-fcc-proceedings/
- TechCrunch, "ICE bought vehicles equipped with fake cell towers to spy on phones" (Oct. 7, 2025): https://techcrunch.com/2025/10/07/ice-bought-vehicles-equipped-with-fake-cell-towers-to-spy-on-phones/
- TechCrunch, "Hacktivist scrapes over 500,000 stalkerware customers' payment records" (Feb. 9, 2026): https://techcrunch.com/2026/02/09/hacktivist-scrapes-over-500000-stalkerware-customers-payment-records/
- Forbes, "ICE Has A Hacking Tool That Breaks A Key Apple Security Feature" (Oct. 8, 2026): https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2026/10/08/ice-can-break-a-major-apple-security-protection/
- NPR, "ICE acknowledges it is using powerful spyware" (Apr. 7, 2026): https://www.npr.org/2026/04/07/nx-s1-5776799/ice-spyware-privacy
- NPR, "DHS says ICE has 'no relationship' with spyware maker Paragon" (May 22, 2026): https://www.npr.org/2026/05/22/nx-s1-5831577/dhs-ice-spyware-paragon
FAQ
Can police get my phone's location without a warrant?
Sometimes. Demanding location records from a carrier or from Google is a Fourth Amendment search under Carpenter (2018) and Chatrie (2026), which generally means a warrant. Buying similar data from a commercial broker is a separate question the Supreme Court has not decided, and agencies including ICE and Nevada's Department of Public Safety have bought access to such data, as reported by 404 Media and KSNV.
What did the Supreme Court decide in Chatrie v. United States?
It held that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone location information, so obtaining Google Location History through a geofence warrant was a search, even for a short window. The Court did not rule on whether that particular warrant was valid; the Fourth Circuit will decide that, and the good-faith question, on remand.
Does turning off location services stop my phone from being tracked?
No. It limits what apps and the operating system can read from GPS and nearby networks. Your carrier still logs which towers your phone connects to, and ad-tech systems can estimate location from your IP address.
Does airplane mode stop phone tracking?
It turns off the cellular radio, which stops new tower records while it is on. It does not erase earlier records. On iPhone, Apple says airplane mode leaves Bluetooth on, and Wi-Fi can be turned back on while it is active, so check both.
What is a Stingray or cell-site simulator?
A device that impersonates a cell tower so phones nearby connect to it, which reveals their identifiers and approximate location. Some models can also intercept calls, texts, and data, as TechCrunch reported. DOJ and DHS policies generally require a warrant to use them, and a 2023 DHS inspector general audit found ICE and the Secret Service did not always follow the rules.
How can I tell if someone installed stalkerware on my phone?
Warning signs and checks are covered by the FTC and the Coalition Against Stalkerware. Both caution that removing it can alert the person who installed it, so plan for safety first, ideally with a domestic violence advocate, before deleting anything.